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Abstract
Rationale Research has shown that alcohol can have both
detrimental and facilitating effects on memory: intoxication
can lead to poor memory for information encoded after alco-
hol consumption (anterograde amnesia) and may improve
memory for information encoded before consumption (retro-
grade facilitation). This study examined whether alcohol con-
sumed after witnessing a crime can render individuals less
vulnerable to misleading post-event information
(misinformation).
Method Participants watched a simulated crime video.
Thereafter, one third of participants expected and received
alcohol (alcohol group), one third did not expect but received
alcohol (reverse placebo), and one third did not expect nor
receive alcohol (control). After alcohol consumption, partici-
pants were exposed to misinformation embedded in a written
narrative about the crime. The following day, participants
completed a cued-recall questionnaire about the event.
Results Control participants were more likely to report misin-
formation compared to the alcohol and reverse placebo group.
Conclusion The findings suggest that we may oversimplify
the effect alcohol has on suggestibility and that sometimes
alcohol can have beneficial effects on eyewitness memory
by protecting against misleading post-event information.
Keywords Eyewitnessmemory . Suggestibility . Alcohol .
Retrograde facilitation . Interference
According to the British Crime Survey (data from 2012/13
and 2013/14 combined), 70% of Bpublic space^ violent inci-
dents were alcohol-related and 93% of those occurred in pubs,
bars, and clubs where alcohol is sold and consumed (Office
for National Statistics 2015). Evans et al. (2009) note that
many witnesses are intoxicated either at the time of a crime,
when interviewed or both. Given these numbers, studies have
explored the effects of alcohol on various aspects of eyewit-
ness memory including free recall, cued recall and line-up
performance with generally detrimental (Crossland et al.
2016; Dysart et al. 2002; Van Oorsouw and Merckelbach
2012; Yuille and Tollestrup 1990) or null effects of alcohol
consumption on memory (Hagsand et al. 2013; Harvey et al.
2013; Schreiber Compo et al. 2012). It should be noted that
some of these studies obtained fairly low levels of intoxication
with their participants and probably underestimated the detri-
mental effect of alcohol on memory performance. Amongst
laboratory studies, the highest peak BAC was .20% (Dysart
et al. 2002) and the smallest peak BAC was .09% (Hagsand
et al. 2013). Low peak BACs ranged from .03% to .05%
(Crossland et al. 2016; Harvey et al. 2013, respectively). In
field studies by Van Oorsouw and Merckelbach (2012) and
Van Oorsouw et al. (2015) slightly higher peak BACs of .24%
and .26% were obtained. It could be argued that negative
effects of alcohol on eyewitness memory performance might
be even more pronounced when higher intoxication levels are
present, however, due to ethical reasons this is often not
achievable in laboratory studies. Recent research, for example
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by Crossland et al. (2016), Hagsand et al. (2013), Van
Oorsouw and Merckelbach (2012) and Van Oorsouw et al.
(2015) have managed to reach higher BAC levels, which
should not be underestimated.
Only a few studies to date have examined the relationship
between alcohol and suggestibility (Santtila et al. 1998, 1999;
Schreiber Compo et al. 2012; Van Oorsouw et al. 2015).
Suggestibility in eyewitnesses is the remembering or reporting
of erroneous details about an event either in response to incor-
rectly leading questions (immediate suggestibility) or through
exposure to incorrect information about the event that is later
recalled (delayed suggestibility) (Ridley and Gudjonsson
2013; Schooler and Loftus 1993). For example, Van
Oorsouw et al. (2015) approached sober (BACs <.02%;
MBAC = 0.01%, SD = 0.01), moderately intoxicated (BACs
between .02% and .11%; MBAC = 0.06%, SD = 0.02) or se-
verely intoxicated (BACs > .11%;MBAC = 0.16%, SD = 0.04)
participants drinking in a bar and required them to commit a
mock crime. In subsequent interviews (which included 15
incorrectly leading questions), those who were severely intox-
icated were more suggestible to the leading questions than
those who were sober. Conversely, Schreiber Compo et al.
(2012), using a delayed rather than immediate suggestibility
paradigm in a laboratory environment, found no difference
between intoxicated (MBAC = .07, SD = .02), placebo and
control participants on the level of suggestibility.
Importantly, in both studies, participants were intoxicated
before witnessing the crime.
Santtila et al. (1998, 1999) explored the effect of alcohol on
immediate suggestibility using the Gudjonsson Suggestibility
Scale 2 (GSS2, Gudjonsson 1997). Participants received a
high (1.32 ml of 95% alcohol per kg of body weight), medium
(.66 ml of 95% alcohol per kg of body weight) or low dose of
alcohol (.132 ml of 95% alcohol per kg of body weight), or a
placebo drink. No BAC readings were taken after alcohol
administration. Alcohol, when administered after the to-be-
remembered narrative, appeared to protect participants from
the negative effect of incorrectly leading questions. There was
no effect when these questions were repeated following neg-
ative feedback. Santtila et al. (1998, 1999) argued that indi-
vidual differences in emotions (e.g., anger and guilt) and per-
sonality (e.g., acquiescence and trait-anxiety) might be re-
sponsible for decreased suggestibility scores before negative
feedback. However, personality and emotions did not
moderate the effects of alcohol on suggestibility. These
findings may reflect what Wixted (2004) called the Bcurious
phenomenon of retrograde facilitation^ (p. 254). Retrograde
facilitation refers to memories being enhanced if they are
formed prior to intoxication. One explanation for this twisted
effect is that alcohol protects already formed memories by
reducing new memory formation (Wixted 2005). That alcohol
and benzodiazepines, if consumed prior to learning, can in-
duce temporary anterograde amnesia to a point where
individuals do not remember anything at all—alcoholic
Bblackout^—is well known (see Wetherill and Fromme
2016 for a review). However, these drugs may have a positive
effect onmemories formed prior to consumption by protecting
them against any new incoming information, thereby reducing
retrograde interference (Wixted 2005). It could be argued that
this protective function may therefore lead to improved mem-
ory even in the absence of a direct interference task by reduc-
ing nonspecific interference and thereby protecting still fragile
recently formed memories.
Evidence for this approach comes from several psycholog-
ical experiments. For example, Parker et al. (1980) tested par-
ticipants’memory for scenic slides and found that having had
alcohol (mean peak BAC = .08%) after learning significantly
improved participants’ recognition performance. Similarly,
Moulton et al. (2005) found that although memory for prose
learned while participants were intoxicated (mean peak
BAC = .08%) was poor compared to sober controls, the op-
posite was found for prose learned prior to intoxication. The
diphasic effect of alcohol on memory performance has been
found with emotional (Bruce and Pihl 1997; MBAC = .06%),
neutral, and alcohol-related stimuli (Weafer et al. 2016a, b;
peak BAC = .08%). Thus, alcohol seems to impair subsequent
recall of information encoded when intoxicated but facilitates
recall of material encountered prior to intoxication due to
minimizing general new memory formation (Wixted 2005).
The diphasic effect of alcohol on memory performance could
have important implications for forensic settings. That is, al-
cohol may not always render witnesses and victims to crime
less reliable, but it depends on the timing of the incident and
the alcohol consumption. For example, an individual might
observe something in a club or pub prior to consuming any
alcohol, and not realize that this will later form a crucial detail
during a criminal investigation. Oblivious to the fact that he/
she will become a witness, the individual might then consume
alcohol during the remaining course of the evening. It could
be argued that in such a scenario, this witness will be less
susceptible to the incorporation of misinformation than an
individual who remained sober.
The present study used a delayed misinformation paradigm
to explore the effects of alcohol administered after a witnessed
event but prior to exposure to misleading information. The
misinformation paradigm is a popular task to study false
memories and suggestibility and findings have important
implications for situations such as eyewitness testimony and
investigative interviewing. For instance, Loftus et al. (1978)
found that information presented after an event can influence
individuals’memory for that event. In a series of experiments
depicting an auto-pedestrian accident, participants who had
initially seen a stop sign, later reported having seen a yield
sign after having been exposed to misleading information.
Since then, the misinformation effect has been examined with
various stimuli and under a variety of conditions and
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researchers were even able to induce very rich false memories,
such as having attended a hospital appointment (Ost et al.
2005) or committing a crime (Shaw and Porter 2015) (see
Loftus 2005 for a review).
In the present experiment, alcohol was administered after
witnessing a crime but prior to the presentation of misinfor-
mation. Cued recall was used to test suggestibility 24 h later
when participants were sober again. To enable us to separate
the physiological and psychological expectancy effects of al-
cohol on suggestibility a reverse placebo treatment condition
(participants were told they would not receive alcohol when in
fact they did) was included. This is fundamental given the
significant body of work demonstrating that alcohol-
outcome expectancies can influence different behaviors and
cognitions (Moss and Albery 2009), such as impulsivity
(Caswell et al. 2013), sexual risk taking (Maisto et al. 2012),
self-perception (Bègue et al. 2013), motor performance
(Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott 1995), and speed of processing




Eighty-three participants (students and staff from London
South Bank University) (60 females, 23 males) aged 18 to
58 years (M = 27.38, SD = 9.45) took part in the study. One
participant did not return to the second session. Participants
either received course credits or a small monetary reward for
their participation. Each individual completed a comprehen-
sive screening process to establish their eligibility to partici-
pate. Age, weight, height, previous drinking history, and any
medical conditions were established to ensure it was safe for
them to consume alcohol. The experiment followed a 3 × 2
mixed design. The between-subjects factor was condition: al-
cohol, control, and reverse placebo. The within-subjects factor
was item type: control vs. misled. That is all participants were
exposed to misleading and control items and had to subse-
quently answer questions relating to these items. The study
was approved by the London South Bank University’s Ethics
Committee.
Materials
Breath alcohol measurementBreath alcohol content (BrAC)
was measured with a Lion Alcolmeter 500 breathalyzer. This
instrument was checked with an alcohol standard at regular
intervals, and recalibrated if required. Participants’ BrAC was
subsequently converted into BAC (blood alcohol contents)
with the Lion Units Converter.
Crime event The event was a video-recorded staged non-
violent crime depicting a distractor burglary. The video foot-
age showed two people, a man and a woman, entering a house
and conducting a survey with the homeowner in the living
room. After a few minutes, the homeowner went into the
kitchen to make some tea. In the mean time, the woman went
upstairs into a room and stole some jewelry, while the man
stole some money and a laptop from the living room. The
robbers then swiftly left the property. The homeowner retuned
from the kitchen and ran after the thieves after he realized that
he has been robbed. The event was 4 min and 25 s long.
Post-event information (PEI) and memory test Pilot testing
was conducted to ensure that memory for each critical detail
was reasonable and the misleading suggestions were seen as
plausible. Twenty-nine participants, comprising of University
students and staff (Mage = 30.06, SD = 9.11, 16 females),
watched the video clip and then completed a cued recall test
immediately. Only items that were remembered more often
than 40% and less than 90% of the time were selected as
potential critical items. Next, participants were presented with
a multiple-choice test including the correct answer to the pre-
viously presented cued recall test and three alternative an-
swers. Participants were asked to circle the option that was
actually presented in the video clip and to rate the plausibility
of each other alternative on a 1 (highly implausible) to 7
(highly plausible) scale. Items with mean plausibility ratings
of 2–6 were included as the misleading details. This was done
to ensure that misinformation items were not completely im-
plausible and therefore directly rejected by participants.
Similarly, it was important to ensure that misinformation items
were not too plausible and therefore more likely to be accepted
by participants than original items (a similar procedure was
used by Horry et al. 2014). The mean plausibility rating for
misleading items was 4.14 (SD = 1.34). After pilot testing, 10
items (out of 30) were selected as critical items.
The PEI was presented in a 330-word narrative. Two ver-
sions of the narrative were created (versions A and B). Each
version included five misleading items. The five misleading
items for half of the participants served as control items for the
other half of participants in order to give an indication of the
extent to which PEI is recounted by chance. Most of the con-
trol items were not mentioned in the narrative or were men-
tioned only in a neutral form (as in Horry et al. 2014). For
example, in version A, participants read the misinformation
that the victim was wearing a green fleece jumper (misleading
item), whereas in version B the victim was only described as
wearing a fleece jumper (control item), in the original video
footage the jumper was blue.
The cued recall memory test consisted of 10 questions—
five enquiring about misleading items and five about control
items. For example, BWhat was the colour of the victims
jumper?^ or BWhat did the female perpetrator carry?^.
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Underneath each question was some space for participants to
provide their answer. Underneath the space for the answer was
a confidence rating scale ranging from 0% (not very confident
at all) to 100% (very confident).
Procedure
The study consisted of two sessions separated by one day.
Participants took part individually. During the first session,
participants watched the staged crime video. They were told
to pay close attention. Subsequently, participants were random-
ly assigned to one of three conditions—received alcohol
(Beck’s lager) and expected alcohol (alcohol condition,
N = 28), received alcohol (Beck’s lager) and did not expect
alcohol (participants were told they received Beck’s Blue, an
alcohol-free lager) (reverse placebo condition, N = 28) and
received no alcohol (Beck’s Blue) and expected no alcohol
(control condition, N = 27). Participants’ gender, height, and
weight were used to calculate the required dose with the
Curtin’s Blood Alcohol Calculator to achieve a peak BAC of
approximately 0.06% (Curtin 2000). All drinks were poured
out of sight of the participants. On being handed their beverage,
participants were told to consume their drink within 30 min but
no faster than 20 min (a similar procedure was used in Santtila
et al. 1998, 1999). Participants then rinsed their mouth with
water to remove residual traces of alcohol and to avoid contam-
ination of subsequent breathalyzer readings. Thereafter, partic-
ipants completed some filler tasks (word search games) for
15 min to allow their BAC to rise (see Crossland et al. 2016).
Participants were then breathalyzed (but not informed about the
reading). If their BAC reading was below the required 0.06% a
further reading was taken 15 min later. It is important to note
that all participants underwent the same procedure regardless of
condition. That is, all participants had to consume the beverage
in the above-described time and all participants were subse-
quently breathalyzed after a 15-min delay at least once.1
All participants were then presented with one of two ver-
sions of the post-event narrative. To ensure that the informa-
tion was being processed, the narrative was presented on six
different cards in a randomly scrambled order. Participants
were told that they would engage in a comprehension task
and that they had to read the cards carefully and subsequently
sort them in chronological order (this procedure was adopted
from Horry et al. 2014). Finally, participants were asked to
read out aloud the sorted narrative cards to the experimenter.
Following the comprehension task, participants were in-
formed about the actual nature of their drink and released from
the first session. Those displaying BACs above .08% (the UK
drink-drive limit) were advised to remain in the lab until their
BAC reduced to below 08%. Those who did not wish to stay
behind had to sign a waiver form, confirming their awareness
of being in excess of the UK drink and drive alcohol limit.
The second session commenced the following day. All par-
ticipants completed the cued-recall memory test in their own
time. They were instructed to think back to the film they
watched and for every question to write down what they re-
member having seen in the film. They were told that the nar-
rative they read during the comprehension task contained
some incorrect details. They were instructed to provide a re-
sponse to every question. If they could not remember, they
were asked to guess. After each question, participants were
asked to rate the confidence in their answer on a scale ranging
from 0% (not confident at all) to 100% (very confident). After
having answered all questions, participants were asked to go
back through their answers and to indicate for each whether
they would be willing to testify to it in a court of law.With this
in mind, participants went through their answers and indicated
with a BT^ next to the answer that they would testify to it or
with a BW^ next to it that they would withhold the answer
(e.g., Horry et al. 2014). Finally, participants were debriefed,
thanked for their participation, and dismissed.
Results
Blood alcohol concentrations
In line with previous research, all BrACs were converted to
BACswith the blood: breath ratio of 2300:1. For the two groups
who consumed alcohol (i.e., alcohol and reverse placebo group),
the average BACwas .065%; BACs ranged from .03% to .11%.
All control participants had a BAC of .00%. A one-way
ANOVA revealed a significant difference between conditions,
F (2, 80) = 174.34, p < .001, η2 = 0.82. The control group
differed significantly from both the alcohol and reverse placebo
group (ps < .001). There was no significant difference between
the alcohol and the reverse placebo group (p > .999) (alcohol
group: M = .063, SD = .02, 95% CI = [.056, .070]; reverse
placebo group:M = .067, SD = .02, 95% CI = [.060, .073]).
Coding and analysis of memory test data
Responses were coded as correct, misled (i.e., contained mis-
information provided in narrative), or incorrect (i.e., contain-
ing other incorrect information). For example, a response was
coded as correct when it coincided with what was actually
shown in the video footage, i.e., the victim wore a blue fleece
jumper in the video and the participant reported on the cued
recall test that the fleece jumper was blue. A response was
coded as misled when it coincided with the misinformation
presented in the narrative and not with the information pro-
vided in the video clip, i.e., the narrative mentioned that the
1 Given that some individuals were breathalyzed twice, the delay between
watching the crime video and the subsequent presentation of misinformation
varied by approximately15 min.
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victim wore a green fleece jumper, whereas it was blue in the
video clip, and the participant reported on the cued recall test
that it was green. A response was coded as incorrect, when it
did not coincide with either the information provided in the
video footage or the narrative, i.e., the participant reported that
the fleece jumper was red. To assess inter-coder reliability,
20% of the cued recall memory tests (16 tests) were coded
by two independent coders. Significant Pearson correlations
between coders were established (correct responses: r = .991,
p < .001; misled responses: r = 1, p < .001; incorrect re-
sponses: r = .989, p < .001).
Proportion of misled responses
A 2 (item: control vs. misled) × 3 (Condition: alcohol vs. con-
trol vs. reverse placebo) mixed ANOVA on the proportion of
misled responses (out of five) revealed a significant main effect
for item, F (1, 79) = 35.39, p < .001, η2 = .0.189. Participants
were more likely to provide a misled response to misinforma-
tion items (M = .36, 95%CI [.309, .405]) than to control items
(M = .17, 95%CI [.133, .209]). The main effect for condition
was also significant, F (2, 79) = 3.51, p = .035, η2 = .088).
Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that the control group pro-
vided significantly more misled responses than the reverse pla-
cebo group (p = .038). There was no significant difference
between the control and alcohol group (p = .183) nor between
the reverse placebo and alcohol group (p > .999) (alcohol:
M = .25, 95%CI [.196, .300]; control: M = .319, 95%CI
[.266, .371]; reverse placebo: M = .22, 95%CI [.174, .276]).
The interaction between item and condition was significant, F
(2, 79) = 8.55, p < .001, η2 = .178. Bonferroni post-hoc tests
revealed that groups did not differ significantly on control items
(alcohol vs. control: p = .478; alcohol vs. reverse placebo:
p > .999; reverse placebo vs. control: p > .999). However, for
the misinformation items a significant difference was present
between the alcohol and control group (p = .002), and between
the reverse placebo and control group (p = .001), but not be-
tween the alcohol and reverse placebo group (p > .999). Thus,
the control group was significantly more likely to give a misled
response to misleading items compared to the alcohol and re-
verse placebo group.2
Proportion correct responses
A 2 (item: control vs. misled) × 3 (condition: alcohol vs.
control vs. reverse placebo) mixed ANOVA on the proportion
of correct responses revealed a significant main effect for item,
F (1, 79) = 8.84, p = .004, η2 = .101. Participants provided
significantly more correct responses to control items (M = .55,
95%CI [.498, .609]) than to misleading items (M = .44,
95%CI [.384, .498]). The main effect for condition, F (2,
79) = .05, p = .956, η2 = .001, and the interaction between
item and condition were not significant, F(2, 79) = 1.34,
p = .267, η2 = .033. Proportions correct and misled responses
are presented in Table 1.
Proportion testified responses
A 3 (response type: correct, incorrect, misled) × 3 (condition:
alcohol vs. control vs. reverse placebo) mixed ANOVA on the
proportion of testified responses revealed a significant main
effect for response type, F (2, 158) = 89.84, p < .001, η2 = .532
(correct: M = .50, 95%CI [.456, .539]; incorrect: M = .08,
95%CI [.056, .105]; misled: M = .36, 95%CI [ .309, .405]).
The main effect for condition was also significant, F (2,
79) = 6.50, p = .002, η2 = .141 (alcohol: M = .30, 95%CI
[.271, .322]; control: M = .35, 95%CI [.324, .375]; reverse
placebo: M = .29, 95%CI [.264, .315]). In addition, the inter-
action between response type and condition was significant F
(4, 158) = 4.66, p = .001, η2 = .106. Bonferroni post-hoc tests
showed that there were no group differences in the proportion
of testified responses for correct and incorrect responses (all
ps > .05). However, the control group was significantly more
likely to testify to a misled response compared to the alcohol
(p = .002) and the reverse placebo group (p = .001). There was
no significant difference between the alcohol and the reverse
placebo group (p > .999). See Table 2 for mean proportions of
testified responses and confidence intervals.
Confidence ratings in correct, incorrect and misled
responses
A 3 (response: correct vs. incorrect vs. misled) × 3 (Condition:
alcohol vs. control vs. reverse placebo) mixed ANOVA re-
vealed a significant main effect for Response Type, F (2,
132) = 79.39, p < .001, η2 = .546 . Bonferroni post-hoc tests
revealed that participants provided significantly lower confi-
dence ratings for errors compared to misled (p < .001) and
correct responses (p < .001). Confidence ratings for misled
responses were also significantly lower than for correct re-
sponses (p = .003). Neither the main effect for Condition, F
(2, 66) = .58, p = .562, η2 = .017, nor the interaction between
Response Type and Condition, F (2, 66) = 1.03, p = .390,
η2 = .031 was significant. See Table 3 for mean confidence
ratings and confidence intervals.
2 A 2 × 3 between-participants ANOVA was conducted on the number of
misled responses including the Narrative Version (A vs. B) as another inde-
pendent variable. A significant main effect for Narrative version (F (1,
72) = 10.34, p = .002) and condition (F (2, 76) = 10.03, p < .001, η2 = .209)
was revealed. Participants gave more misled responses for narrative A
(M = 2.14, 95%CI [1.825, 2.460]) compared to narrative B (M = 1.40,
95%CI [1.083, 1.734]). Post-hoc tests showed that the control group provided
significantly more misled responses than the alcohol (p = .001) and the reserve
placebo groups (p < .001). There was no significant difference for misled
responses between the alcohol and reverse placebo group (p > .999).
Importantly, the interaction between narrative version and condition was not
significant (F (2, 76) = .83, p = .441, η2 = 0.21). Thus, individuals gave more
misled responses when provided with narrative A compared to narrative B.
However, this effect did not moderate the effect of Condition.
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Confidence ratings in testified and withheld responses
A 2 (response type: testify vs. withheld) × 3 (condition: alco-
hol vs. control vs. reverse placebo) mixed ANOVA on the
mean confidence ratings for testified and withheld responses
revealed a significant main effect for response type, F (1,
77) = 308.43, p < .001, η2 = .800. Participants were signifi-
cantly more confident in testified responses (M = 79.50,
95%CI [76.04, 82.94]) than in withheld responses
(M = 37.99, 95%CI [34.02, 41.92]). No significant main effect
for condition was revealed, F (2, 77) = .30, p = .738, η2 = .008.
The interaction between response type and condition was not
significant, F (2, 77) = .24, p = .785, η2 = .006. See Table 3 for
mean confidence ratings and 95% confidence intervals.
Discussion
The current study was designed to examine alcohol-induced
retrograde facilitation in a delayed misinformation paradigm.
We are the first to show that alcohol consumption after having
witnessed a criminal event can protect memory from the neg-
ative effects of misinformation. Contrary to the general belief
and empirical finding that alcohol impairs eyewitness memo-
ry, we found that individuals who consumed alcohol (alcohol
and reverse placebo group) after the observed event but prior
to encounteringmisleading information, reported significantly
fewer misinformation items on a subsequent memory test
compared to the control group (who did not receive any alco-
hol). A particularly worrying finding is that the sober partici-
pants were also more likely to be prepared to testify a misled
response in a court of law. No difference in the proportion of
correct responses provided was found between groups. Nor
did the groups differ with regards to how confident they were
in their responses.
A potential explanation for reduced suggestibility is that
alcohol leads to decreased retrograde interference (Mueller
et al. 1983). That is intoxication reduces the formation of
new memories thereby protecting already existing memories
and making them less vulnerable to interference. Alcohol-
induced retrograde facilitation has been demonstrated in pre-
vious studies using list of words, sentences, pictures and prose
passages (Bruce and Pihl 1997; Moulton et al. 2005; Parker
et al. 1980; Weafer et al. 2016a, b). Our findings demonstrate
that alcohol-induced facilitation holds true for autobiographi-
cal memories in a misinformation eyewitness paradigm.
Including a reverse placebo group allowed us to shed more
light on expectancy and pharmacological effects of alcohol
consumption on retrograde facilitation. Both the alcohol and
reverse placebo group were less suggestible to misinforma-
tion, indicating that the facilitated memory effect is more like-
ly to be due to the pharmacological effects of alcohol rather
than due to alcohol-related beliefs. This is in line with the
findings reported by Parker et al. (1981) who showed that
the alcohol-induced facilitation effect is dose-dependent.
These are tentative conclusions and further research is needed
to disentangle expectancy and pharmacological effects on ret-
rograde memory facilitation. The current study did not mea-
sure participants’ subjective beliefs regarding their intoxica-
tion level, and we cannot preclude that control participants
thought that they were actually drinking alcohol (even if they
were told that they received Beck’s Blue).
Table 1 Mean (and 95% CI) proportion correct (out of 5) and misled (out of 5) responses for control and misleading items in each condition (alcohol,
control and reverse placebo)
Item Condition
Alcohol Control Reverse Placebo
Control Misleading Control Misleading Control Misleading
Correct responses .52 [.422, .615]a .46 [.360, .558]a .60 [.503, .697]b .40 [.301, .499]b .54 [.448, .638]c .46 [.367, .561]c
Misled responses .20 [.134, .266] .30 [.213, .380]d .13 [.067, .199] .50 [.420, .587]de .17 [.114, .243] .27 [.189, .353]e
a b c d e Cells sharing the same capital differ significantly from each other
Table 2 Mean proportion of
testified responses (and 95%
confidence intervals) for correct
(out of 10), incorrect (out of 10)
and misled (out of 5) responses
for each condition (alcohol,
control and reverse placebo)
Proportion testified Condition
Alcohol Control Reverse Placebo
Correct responses .49 [.416, .561] .50 [.427, .573] .50 [.432, .575]
Incorrect responses .10 [.061, .146] .04 [.002, .087] .09 [.051, .135]
Misled responses .30 [.213, .380]a .50 [.420, .587]ab .27 [.189, .353]b
a b Cells sharing the same capital differ significantly from each other
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Furthermore, our results disconfirm a competing theory for
enhanced learning prior to alcohol consumption—improved
consolidation of memory traces (Parker et al. 1980).
According to this theory, alcohol increases processing (i.e.,
consolidation) of previously learned material. Contrary to this
view, we did not find group differences in the proportion of
correct responses provided. Our findings are more in line with
the interference-reduction view (Mueller et al. 1983). That is,
alcohol reduces the amount of new incoming information
from entering memory and as a result preserves already
existing memories. Intoxicated eyewitnesses were conse-
quently less suggestible to misinformation in our study.
It is important to note that we are not implying that incom-
ing misinformation impairs memory for the original event in
the absence of alcohol. As highlighted and demonstrated by
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) in a series of studies, origi-
nally formed memories may still be intact and co-exist togeth-
er with the misleading information. They used the misinfor-
mation paradigm but included a modified test version.
Depending on their condition, participants were either pre-
sented with misinformation or no misinformation (control
group). At test, participants were presented with two forced-
choice alternatives, the original item and a new item (the
misleading information was not an option). They found no
difference in performance between groups at test. That is,
misled participants were as likely as control participants to
choose the original item, providing no evidence for memory
impairment.
To test whether alcohol indeed hinders new information
from entering memory, future research should use a forced-
choice recognition test, similar to McCloskey and Zaragoza’s
(1985) modified test version, rather than a cued recall test. The
test alternatives would be the misinformation item and a new
item. If alcohol really blocks/reduces interfering information
from entering memory, then participants in the alcohol group
should be as likely to choose the misinformation as the new
item at test (chance performance). Control participants, how-
ever, should be more likely to pick the misinformation item
compared to the new item. This finding would provide inde-
pendent evidence for the claim that alcohol blocks/reduces
misinformation from entering memory.
In relation to the confidence ratings given for cued-recall
responses, we did not find any differences between groups.
However, we did find that mean confidence levels differed
across response type. Participants were significantly more
confident in correct responses compared to misled and incor-
rect responses. Intriguingly, participants were also significant-
ly more confident in misled responses than in incorrect ones.
The source-monitoring framework (Johnson et al. 1993) may
offer an explanation for this finding. When participants are
asked a cued recall question, several response alternatives
are generated. The participant has to then decide whether to
report one or not. This decision is dependent on whether the
participant can retrieve any source memory for the alternative
answers (i.e., any spatial, temporal, modal, or social contex-
tual cues). Erroneous responses are usually associated with an
inability to specify the source of the information and are there-
fore reported with low confidence. Individuals might report
suggested details with higher confidence because either the
misled response might wrongly elicit event-related cues (i.e.,
source confusion error), or the misled response was retrieved
easily (i.e., with high retrieval fluency). In both cases, the
misled response would be given with increased confidence
(Horry et al. 2014). It is interesting to note that in the current
study although participants were on average more confident in
misled responses than in errors, they were most confident in
correct responses.
It remains to be seen whether the alcohol-induced retro-
grade facilitation effect can be generalized to other types of
misinformation. Misinformation can be introduced indirectly,
through embedding it in a set of questions (Loftus et al. 1978),
or directly, through a face-to-face encounter (Blank et al.
2013; Gabbert et al. 2003). The scrambled sentence task used
in this study can be regarded as an indirect way of introducing
misinformation. Further research will be necessary to explore
the impact of alcohol on suggestibility when the misinforma-
tion is presented in a more direct way.
Future research should also explore whether alcohol-
induced retrograde facilitation is present in more realistic fo-
rensic settings. Only a few field studies on the impact of alco-
hol on eyewitness memory performance exist (Van Oorsouw
and Merckelbach 2012; Van Oorsouw et al. 2015) and none
Table 3 Mean (95% confidence
intervals) of confidence ratings to
correct, incorrect and misled
responses for each condition
(alcohol, control and reverse
placebo)
Confidence % Condition
Alcohol Control Reverse placebo
Correct responses 74.30 [66.61, 81.98]a 70.64 [62.63, 78.66]b 73.20 [64.81, 81.58]c
Incorrect responses 33.80 [23.43, 44.16]a 37.25 [26.44, 48.05]b 39.56 [27.79, 50.41]c
Misled responses 57.13 [48.76, 65.51]a 65.14 [56.41, 73.87]b 69.29 [60.15, 78.42]c
Testified responses 78.41 [72.36, 84.47]d 79.19 [73.25, 85.13]e 80.86 [74.93, 86.80]f
Withheld responses 35.85 [28.92, 42.78]d 39.99 [33.19, 46.79]e 38.07 [31.27, 44.87]f
a b c d e f Cells sharing the same capital differ significantly from each other
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has explored retrograde facilitation. For example, is this phe-
nomenon also present when people are mildly intoxicated
when witnessing the event and more severely intoxicated
when presented with misinformation? Such a scenario could
be regarded as more ecologically valid, as witnesses may be
already mildly intoxicated before observing a crime. The av-
erage peak BAC of .065% in the current study could be con-
sidered fairly low, and future research should test alcohol-
induced retrograde facilitation under higher levels of intoxica-
tion, which are more likely to be found in the real world. From
a practical and theoretical perspective, it would be also valu-
able to examine how long the protective effect of alcohol
against misinformation lasts for. There are often lengthy pas-
sages of time between the crime and the recalling of the event
by the witness. It could be argued that with longer delays, all
individuals might becomemore suggestible to misinformation
regardless of their intoxication level after encoding and prior
to the endorsement of misinformation (e.g., Hertel et al. 1980;
Loftus et al. 1978). Would the inoculating effect of alcohol
against misinformation disappear with longer time delays?
Future studies should also examine the effects of alcohol on
retrograde facilitation on different limbs (ascending and de-
scending) of the BAC curve. Research has shown that alcohol
might have differential effects on memory depending on the
task, the memory type, and limb of the BAC curve (Söderlund
et al. 2005).
In summary, our findings indicate that the timing of alcohol
consumption plays an important role in determining how ac-
curate and reliable subsequent memory reports are. The as-
sumption that alcohol inevitably impairs eyewitness memory
performance is oversimplified. We suggest that in certain cir-
cumstances alcohol intoxication can protect eyewitness mem-
ory by making individuals less suggestible to misinformation.
Scientists who are conducting research in the field need to take
this into account when designing their experiments and
interpreting their findings, for example by asking participants
about subsequent drinking behavior between testing sessions.
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